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11 Introduction
The philosophical literature on models in science has drawn attention to a
variety of issues of great importance for understanding the practice of sci-
ence (Bailer-Jones 1999; Frigg and Hartmann 2012), as numerous case studies
attest.1 One of the key insights, emphasized both by Cartwright (1999) and
Morrison (1999), is that a distinctive feature of models is their partial in-
dependence from both theory and data—in a sense explicated by Morrison
and Morgan (1999) they mediate between them. Morrison and Morgan argue
that this autonomy is obtained through the construction of models: models
are neither derived from theory nor simple representations of data. It is this
autonomy, they claim, that affords us the possibility of learning from models,
whether about phenomena or theory.
Morgan and Morrison’s account emphasizes the construction and repre-
sentational function of models, as they claim that these ground the autonomy
and functions of models. They propose, however, that “there are no rules for
model building” (Morrison and Morgan 1999, 31); modeling, they suggest,
may depend on the creativity of model builders or simply be a tacit skill of
some scientists (Morrison and Morgan 1999, 12). In keeping with this idea,
philosophical studies of models tend to begin with a constructed models “in
hand” and proceed to inquire into the practical application of these models
or their metaphysics, e.g. their nature, ability to represent, and how to distin-
guish them from theories (Frigg and Hartmann 2012). While these topics are
clearly of philosophical interest, their predominance has limited left relatively
little attention to equally important epistemological questions about models
(Frigg and Hartmann 2012, §3): how knowledge about models is converted
into knowledge about phenomena, why autonomy affords the possibility of
particular kinds of learning, and why models are constructed with particular
degrees of independence from theory and experiment. This last question is the
one investigated in this paper.
A starting point to a better understanding of the link between autonomy
and learning is to begin with the observation that models may be autonomous
from theory and data to varying degrees and in different respects. This natu-
rally leads one to wonder what accounts for modelers’ choices in model con-
struction, since these are the very choices, according to Morrison and Morgan’s
account, which should result in autonomy of a particular degree and respect.
Although some degree of creativity and skill is no doubt required in the con-
struction of models, it is not unreasonable to suppose that there are always
salient, justifiable grounds (albeit context specific ones) which help determine
particular choices in model construction.2
1 See, e.g., (Cartwright 1983; Cartwright et al. 1995; Hartmann 1995; Psillos 1995; Morgan
and Morrison 1999; Plutynski 2001; Leonelli 2008; Gru¨ne-Yanoff 2009; Toon 2011).
2 In this respect the situation with vis-a`-vis models is more tractable than that vis-a`-vis
theories, since models can usually be situated in a more or less clear theoretical context,
whereas situating theories in their wider context (e.g. research programme (Lakatos 1970),
paradigm (Kuhn 1996), or research tradition (Laudan 1977)) can be more difficult, since this
2Insight into these grounds can plausibly be obtained by attending to the
particular learning aims of the scientists involved. These aims inform the req-
uisite functions of a model, which then determine (to some extent) how the
model should be constructed. This perspective on models thus neatly reverses
the scheme given by Morrison and Morgan, which moved from the construction
of models to their autonomy to their function as tools of learning. In adopting
it here we do not see ourselves as offering a competing account to Morrison
and Morgan’s but rather a complementary and constructive point of view on
models as mediators.
We illustrate this approach through the use of a particular example drawn
from recent work in high energy physics concerning Beyond Standard Model
(BSM) searches at the large hadron collider (LHC) at CERN. The models
that we draw attention to are known as “simplified models”.3 They have seen
wide application in recent years at the two main experiments at the LHC (AT-
LAS and CMS) since their introduction in the late 2000s.4 They are perfect
examples of “models as mediators”, demonstrating partial autonomy through
their construction and a variety of functions which contribute to their utility
in learning about potential new phenomena and about theory. The multi-
plicity of their relations to theory and experiment—to quantum field theory
(QFT), the standard model (SM) of particle physics, speculative BSM ideas
like supersymmetry (SUSY), and collider data from the LHC and Tevatron
experiments—also permits a study of the variety and degree of independence
from these in concert with simplified models’ various intended functions. This
variety makes simplified models an attractive and nuanced example for illus-
trating how modeling choices may be determined and grounded in the larger
epistemological context of models.
Our principal claim concerning simplified models in this paper is that they
are constructed in order to solve certain important epistemological problems
posed by the current theoretical and experimental context in high energy
physics. The two primary problems faced by BSM searches presently are the
lack of reliable theoretical guidance and the lack of any discrepancies between
SM predictions and collider data. One might think that these circumstances
together suggest that BSM physics is a bit of a will-o’-the-wisp, but there
are many reasons (of varying strength) to expect that there is physics beyond
the SM, including the existence of dark matter (Zinkernagel 2002; Smeenk
2013), naturalness and the hierarchy problem (Giudice 2008; Grinbaum 2012;
Williams 2015), and unification (Maudlin 1996; Wayne 1996; Morrison 2000; Li
2003). There are various proposals for solving these problems, the most promi-
context depends on more nebulous, often implicit ideas like a metaphysical or theoretical
core.
3 Some work in the philosophy of science has already noted with interest the example of
simplified models (Borrelli and Sto¨ltzner 2013).
4 See, e.g. (the ATLAS Collaboration 2012b, 2015; the CMS Collaboration 2013). The
original paper proposing the idea of simplified models is (Alwall et al. 2009), building on
ideas in (Arkani-Hamed et al. 2007) and related work in (Arkani-Hamed et al. 2006; Knuteson
and Mrenna 2006; Hubisz et al. 2008).
3nent of which is the assumption of SUSY. Presently SUSY is a speculative idea
which remains empirically unconfirmed, and the theoretical arguments for it
to appear at the relatively low energies testable by the LHC are not especially
strong (although many theoretical physicists do find them compelling). The
highly speculative nature of BSM physics means that theory is not a reliable
guide for BSM searches. Thus, where to look and what to look for are quite
unconstrained in BSM searches, due to the epistemological context of current
high energy physics.
This present context contrasts with the circumstances surrounding the
search for the SM Higgs, where there were plentiful data indicating that the
SM (of which the Higgs is a crucial part) was correct and strong theoretical
arguments for its existence.5 In other words, where to look and what to look
for were strongly constrained in the case of Higgs search, unlike the present
circumstances in BSM searches.
The paper is organized as follows. To begin (§2) we briefly motivate our
investigation by introducing the models as mediators framework and showing
how the novel perspective we introduce leads to the epistemological question
we take up in the paper. We then introduce simplified models (§3), explain-
ing their construction as “incomplete” effective field theories that abstract
from various BSM physics scenarios and providing a concrete example. We
then describe the functions of simplified models from the perspective of the
theoretical physicist and show how simplified models are motivated by epis-
temological problems on the theory side (§4). In §5 we describe the functions
of simplified models from the perspective of the experimental physicists and
show how simplified models are motivated by epistemological problems on the
experimental side. The next section (§6) briefly remarks on the application
of the ideas in the previous section to epistemological issues with Big Data
science. We provide some concluding remarks in §7.
2 A Different Perspective on Models as Mediators
The principal concern of (Morrison and Morgan 1999) is to articulate an ac-
count of the autonomy—from both theory and phenomena—of models in order
to show how they may function as instruments of learning. Their account is
motivated by the recognition that “there is a significant connection between
the autonomy of models and their ability to function as instruments” (Mor-
rison and Morgan 1999, 10). They ground the autonomy of models in their
construction and their ability to represent. Accordingly, the account outlines
the four main aspects of models mentioned: their construction, their function-
ing (as instruments), how they represent, and how they are used as tools of
5 At least the existence of some Higgs mechanism was expected, since there are a va-
riety of ways the Higgs mechanism could be realized (Borrelli and Sto¨ltzner 2013). That
the simplest realization of the mechanism, the SM Higgs, was the one discovered was per-
haps somewhat surprising (and even disappointing to many theorists, who hoped for the
possibility of developing new theory).
4learning. In this section we briefly introduce these four components and their
connections as presented in (Morrison and Morgan 1999), then show how to
re-orient their account as a way to highlight how learning drives functioning
and construction.
First, a brief overview of how these components are connected in the Mor-
rison and Morgan account. They begin with model construction, for on their
view it is because models are constructed partially from theory and partially
from data that they are partially independent from each. It is precisely in
this sense that they mean models are (partially) autonomous. This autonomy-
through-construction allows models to function, as they say, like a tool or
instrument. They also emphasize that a model’s representative capacity or
capability is crucial for it to function autonomously in this way. Finally, they
state that learning from or through a model is facilitated by constructing it
and using it. Indeed, they suppose that autonomous functioning is required for
learning about and mediating between theory and world with models. The fol-
lowing illustration pictures these main components and their direct relations:
Construction
%%
Functioning // Learning
Representation
99
In short, the Morrison and Morgan account of models indicates how partial
independence from theory and data in the construction of models grounds the
autonomous functioning of models, which is necessary in order to learn from
models about theory and data. A model’s capacity to represent the world is
also necessary for its autonomous functioning, but as representation is not
particularly relevant to our concerns, we will mostly set aside its role in the
following. Let us therefore prune the previous diagram slightly to the compo-
nents that will be of primary interest:
Construction // Functioning // Learning
Morrison and Morgan do not actually provide an argument per se for the
claim that autonomy, obtained by construction and manifested in function-
ing, is necessary for learning. There is a reasonably straightforward way to
understand it, however, and no doubt this is what they had in mind. Consider
first a simple model that divides the epistemological products of science into
two categories: theory and data. The mutual autonomy of theory and data
grounds the possibility of learning in the following way. To subject a theory
to test, it must be possible for the data to be consistent with its predictions
and it must be possible for the data to be inconsistent with them. The data
must be autonomous with respect to any given theory, in other words, so
5that we can learn something about the theory by performing experimental
tests, e.g. whether it is true or at least empirically adequate. Conversely, given
some experimental data, some theories are consistent with it and some are
not—empirical data underdetermine theory. The theories are importantly au-
tonomous with respect to any given empirical data, so we can learn something
about the data by theorizing, e.g. what the data represent or even what data
are possible to obtain.
This mutual autonomy, and hence the possibility of learning from it, can be
easily extended to the view of scientific products which includes models: models
and theories are mutually independent because (a) theory does not determine
a particular model and (b) particular models underdetermine theory; models
and data are mutually independent because (c) data are not determined by
models and (d) particular data underdetermine models of that data.
Given these comments, it is plausible to suppose that models possess dif-
ferent degrees and kinds of autonomy with respect both to theory and to data.
What, though, determines the kinds and degrees of a model’s independence
(and dependence)? While some may insist that the construction of a model is
an “art” and nothing can be gained from pursuing an investigation along this
line, it is plausible to suppose that there are at least some relevant epistemo-
logical considerations which significantly influence the construction of models.
As said in the introduction, we suggest that the natural starting point is to
look at what scientists hope to learn from their models. This thought moti-
vates re-orienting our perspective on models as mediators, from the direction
highlighted by Morrison and Morgan,
Construction // Functioning // Learning
to the reverse direction:
Construction Functioningoo Learningoo
More explicitly, the basic suggestion is that valuable insight into the au-
tonomy and construction of models is to be had by investigating first what
scientists wish to learn from a model. In other words, we aim to show how
scientists’ epistemological goals can (partially) determine how a model should
function and hence how it should be constructed. This does not mean that
construction is necessarily a mere pragmatic matter, however, wholly depen-
dent on the particular aims of individual scientists or groups of scientists. The
relevant aims may be grounded in, among other things, objective assessments
of the viability of (or confidence in) present theories, models, and data, which
assessments suggest on what a novel model should be dependent and of what
it should be independent. To elucidate the foregoing ideas, we turn to our
concrete examplesimplified modelsin the following sections.
3 Simplified Models
Simplified models have emerged in recent years as a useful class of models in
high energy physics, particularly because of how they mediate between the
6data collected at particle colliders and the theoretical scenarios explored in
BSM physics (as we explain in the following). A “simplified model” in this
context is an extension of the SM that adds only a couple of new hypotheti-
cal BSM particles to the SM, along with decay chains of these particles into
BSM and SM particles (Alwall et al. 2009; LHC New Physics Working Group
2012). They are “simplified” because, unlike full BSM models, which typi-
cally introduce numerous particles and decay chains, each simplified model
only introduces a small handful of new experimental parameters to the SM:
the masses of the posited BSM particles and a few cross sections and branch-
ing ratios.6 It is important to stress that probably no physicist thinks that a
simplified model is a realistic model of BSM physics.7 Their utility is to be
explained, however, by their being embedded in relations of dependence and
independence to possible BSM physics and collider experiments.
Physicists expect that BSM particle physics will include novel phenomena
at extremely high energies (presumably described by some theory of quantum
gravity) as well as lower energy phenomena that may be detectable by the
LHC in the near future. The complete and correct underlying BSM theory (if
any such theory indeed exists) presently remains beyond the reach of current
physics, both theoretically and experimentally. For the most basic purposes of
particle physics experiments, however, all one needs is a low energy effective
field theory (EFT) that describes particle phenomena at the energies relevant
for collider experiments. Now, if a complete BSM theory (or at least a higher
energy EFT) was in hand, then in principle one could construct an appropri-
ate EFT by “integrating out” the undetectable higher energy particles and
modifying the remainder of the theory to account for their effects on the de-
tectable low energy physics (Cao and Schweber 1993, 64). Since such is not so
in hand, theoretical physicists generally proceed by developing plausible EFTs
on the usual physical grounds, i.e. plausible constraints, observed phenomenol-
ogy, etc. (Bain 2013). This EFT “philosophy” is widespread in contemporary
physics because it is “a practical and convenient way of proceeding in describ-
ing natural phenomena” (Castellani 2002), without the need for developing a
fully fleshed out fundamental theory.8
Simplified models are themselves essentially EFTs motivated by BSM con-
siderations, although they are not constructed on the aforementioned “usual”
physical grounds, e.g. symmetry principles or constraints, and they are not
phenomenological models either. Unlike the SM, which is plausibly a low en-
ergy EFT of a higher energy EFT or full BSM theory, simplified models are
6 A cross section in particle physics is an “effective area” that represents the likelihood
of a scattering event given the incoming and outgoing particles. Since different transitions
and decays are possible in particle physics experiments, one also needs to know the ratios
of these different transitions (what is known as the branching ratio).
7 The representational nature of simplified models is an open question worthy of inves-
tigation. Although we do not take a stand on this question here, we note as potentially
relevant the idea that models may be “fictional” (Frigg 2010), “idealized” (McMullin 1985;
Cartwright 1989), or even non-representational “false models” (Wimsatt 1987).
8 For the relation of EFTs to the models-as-mediators framework, see in particular (Hart-
mann 2001).
7primarily constructed as heuristic tools (as we describe in detail later). In
particular, they are not expected (due to their simplifications) to be candi-
dates to succeed the SM; they are rather taken to be, as already mentioned, in
some sense “incomplete” models. Indeed, no plausible physical principle would
suggest that the correct EFT describing particle phenomenology at the LHC
would include just the particular particles and decay channels of any individual
simplified model. It may seem “counter-intuitive” to construct such “deliber-
ately incomplete models” (Alwall et al. 2009, 2) in this way; nevertheless, our
discussion of the functioning of simplified models in the following sections,
building in particular on the suggestions in (Arkani-Hamed et al. 2007) and
(Alwall et al. 2009), shows why simplified models are methodologically sensible
to adopt.
It should be emphasized at this point that simplified models are not purely
arbitrary constructions. The simplified models originally introduced in (Alwall
et al. 2009) are, for example, motivated by SUSY phenomenology (SUSY mod-
els being the most popular among the BSM physics models), as are most of the
many simplified models constructed since (LHC New Physics Working Group
2012). Nevertheless, simplified models are to some extent “model-independent”
in the sense that they do not assume that supersymmetry actually exists, which
would require the introduction of super-partners for every SM particle, nor do
they reflect the particular constraints or principles of any particular SUSY
theoretical model. Indeed, the utility of simplified models does not necessarily
depend on the eventual validation of any SUSY model. Thus, even if super-
symmetry turned out to be false, simplified models would still be useful for
characterizing BSM physics, as the particles and decay channels in simplified
models are also relatable to a variety of non-SUSY BSM phenomenology (LHC
New Physics Working Group 2012). So long as the products of the modeled de-
cays are detectable as hadronic jets, missing transverse energy, or leptons (all
of which are detectable at collider experiments), the SUSY-motivated sim-
plified models can still be used to characterize BSM physics (Alwall et al.
2009, 1). More unusual phenomenology that does not fit this mold, lumped
together under the label “exotica” in particle physics, e.g. displaced vertex sig-
natures, lepton jets, “weird” tracks, etc., has also motivated the introduction
of other simplified models besides those motivated from SUSY physics (LHC
New Physics Working Group 2012, §VII). The guiding idea behind developing
the set of simplified models is to cover all the anticipated BSM phenomenology
that is both theoretically possible and experimentally detectable at the LHC
(and other potential collider experiments as well).
Before looking at an example of a simplified model, it will help to say a
little about SUSY and SUSY terminology. Supersymmetry is popular among
theoretical physicists and can be motivated in several ways—as a solution to
the hierarchy problem, to help with grand unification, to explain dark matter,
etc. In SUSY models, every SM particle has a partner related by supersymme-
try (a “superpartner”), i.e. a particle that shares many of its properties but
8differs in its intrinsic spin by one-half.9 Thus each boson (integer spin) has a
fermion (half-integer spin) as a superpartner, and each fermion has a boson
as a superpartner. The superpartner bosons’ names are just the names of the
SM fermions preceded by an s’. For example, the electron’s superpartner is the
“selectron” and quark superpartners are called “squarks”. The superpartner
fermion’s names are the names of the SM bosons (with slight variation) with
“ino” appended. Thus, the gluon’s superpartner is the “gluino” and the W’s
superpartner is the “wino”.
Our first example is one of the leptonic decay simplified models from (Al-
wall et al. 2009). In this model, an LHC proton-proton collision (eventually)
produces a pair of quark superpartners, i.e. squarks (labeled “Q” in the dia-
gram). These squarks are high mass unstable particles and so quickly decay
into further decay products. This particular model has four possible decay
channels for the squark. The squark may decay into a SM quark (q), giving
rise to a detectable jet event in the LHC detector, and an LSP (lightest super-
symmetric particle), which is both stable and “invisible” (its existence would
be inferred from the detection of missing transverse energy E
T
). It may also
decay into a quark and, via an intermediate state, a W or Z boson and an LSP.
The third possibility is a decay (via intermediate states) to quarks, leptons (l),
and an LSP; the fourth is a decay to quarks, a lepton, a neutrino (ν), and a
LSP. Each of these four decay channels has a calculable cross-section and the
model has an associated branching ratio, which determines the likelihood of
the squark decaying along each of the four decay chains. There are three (or
four) new masses which would be measurable (inferable) in this model: the
mass of the squark (Q), the masses of the intermediate particle state(s) (I and
L), and the mass of the LSP (which would be inferred from the missing energy
E
T
).
Fig. 1 A leptonic decay simplified model (adapted from Alwall et al. “Simplified models
for a first characterization of new physics at the LHC.” Physical Review D 79: (2009) 1–38.)
With this preliminary introduction to simplified models in mind, it is
straightforward to show how simplified models illustrate the four components
(construction, functioning, representing, and learning) of Morrison and Mor-
gan’s framework and what grounds their construction.10 To begin, simplified
9 One thing that realistic superpartners do not share is the mass of the SM particle, else
they would have been detected by now. Thus, SUSY must be a broken symmetry, if it exists,
so that superpartners may have larger masses.
10 Cf. also a similar analysis of Higgs models in (Borrelli and Sto¨ltzner 2013).
9models, like the one described above, are constructed to be autonomous, in
that they are both partially independent from collider data and also partially
independent of the details of any specific BSM theory. In an obvious sense,
they are not independent of QFT howeverthey are QFTs, i.e. models of the
general QFT framework. Still, there is also a slight sense in which simplified
models are independent of QFT, namely that simplified models can potentially
be useful for characterizing BSM phenomena that may well not be describable
by QFT, e.g. quantum gravitational phenomena (if it were to have a detectable
effect on low energy physics).
It is also worth remarking that since most simplified models reflect the
phenomenology of SUSY models and are EFTs, they are, in a clear sense,
theory-driven models. In this respect simplified models reflect the theory-
driven methodology of physics (pace (Cartwright et al. 1995)). Simplified mod-
els are also plainly independent of experiment in their construction, for no
BSM phenomena has yet been observed in particle experiments. They simply
cannot be data-driven or phenomenological models, since there are no data
(at present) to drive them.11 Indeed, they are modeling particles which, for
all we know, might well prove to be non-existent! Yet there is an important
sense in which the construction of simplified models is driven by experimen-
tal considerations. Simplified models are chosen because their parameters are
easily relatable to collider observables, viz. particle masses, cross-sections, and
branching ratios.12
As noted in §2, in Morrison and Morgan’s framework the autonomy of
models derives (in part) from their independence from theory and data by
construction. Simplified models are indeed partially autonomous in this way.
Morrison and Morgan also claim that the autonomy of models derives (in
part) from their representational capacity. Although representation, again, is
not particularly relevant to the argument of this paper, a few remarks on the
topic are called for, as simplified models are of some interest in this respect
as well. Simplified models are, as noted previously, deliberately constructed to
be incomplete models of physics. That alone makes them “idealized models”;
they may, however, be completely wrong-headed in Wimsatt’s sense: “not only
are there interactions wrong, but a significant number of the entities and/or
their properties do not exist” (Wimsatt 1987, 29). This could happen, for ex-
ample, if some collision products (jets, leptons, missing energy) well-described
by a simplified model are actually produced through multiple processes, com-
plicated interactions, etc. and not at all via the simple decay chains of the
simplified model. In the case where simplified models are merely incomplete
one has a case for denying that they represent; if they are completely wrong-
headed, one has even a stronger case. On the other hand, it is arguable that
11 Thus the account from (Cartwright 1983) where an “unprepared description” of all
we know about the phenomenon under investigation is adapted to theory in a “prepared
description” is inapplicable in cases such as this one.
12 Alwall et al. (2009) in particular note that a major advantage of simplified models
(especially the four they introduce) is that they are related to important, discriminating
collider observables, e.g. mass signatures, and lepton and heavy quark counts.
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simplified models can represent the observed phenomena indirectly and par-
tially (perhaps along the lines suggested in (Bailer-Jones 2003)). Although we
cannot pursue this issue further here, since our present aims lie elsewhere,
these remarks do suggest that simplified models are a particularly interesting
case to investigate for those interested in debates on scientific representation.
4 Theoretical Perspectives on Simplified Models
Much of the current work of theoretical physicists in high energy physics is
dedicated either to rethinking the conceptual foundations of the SM or else to
the construction of BSM models.13 Simplified models can and do play a useful
role in these activities. Indeed, the independence of simplified models from
BSM physics and their connection to experiment allows theoretical physicists
to learn about BSM physics in ways that pure theoretical work and empirical
data would not permit. This section demonstrates how the learning aims of
theoretical physicists play a crucial role in the particular construction of sim-
plified models and how these aims are grounded in the present epistemological
context of high energy physics. We start by relating the two main functions of
simplified models relevant to theorizing: (1) ruling out individual BSM models
and (2) guiding BSM model building.
First, simplified models can be used to rule out individual BSM models (Al-
wall et al. 2009, 4). Although direct comparison of a BSM model with collider
data is adequate to this task, simplified models can facilitate this procedure—
a theorist merely has to determine what predictions her model will make in
terms of each simplified model’s carefully selected few parameters to see if her
model is consistent with the data (we describe this procedure in some detail
in §5), rather than determining what experimental predictions the theoretical
model makes for any particular experimental apparatus. This is a relatively
simple function, one which is, again, not strictly necessary as theorists can
directly compare theoretical models to experimental data. (Furthermore, the-
orists may in fact prefer not to do things this way, as explained below.)
These considerations make the second function more significant. It is that
simplified models can be used to guide the process of BSM model building.
This guidance is potentially manifested in two ways, viz. in terms of negative
guidance (constraints) and in terms of positive guidance.
Concerning positive guidance, in the event of the detection of new BSM
phenomena at the LHC, a best-fit simplified model is heuristically useful for
suggesting a corresponding complete BSM model (or set of models) for the new
phenomena. As Alwall et al. (2009, 33) point out, “a reasonable hypothesis for
the new physics is one that is consistent with the simplified model, except that
where the data differs from the simplified model, the hypothesis differs in the
same direction”. What they mean is that discrepancies between the data and
the simplified model (which one expects) suggest what additional processes
might need to be included in a more complete model.
13 Cf. the detailed study of Higgs model building in (Borrelli and Sto¨ltzner 2013).
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As negative guidance, the presentation of experimental data in terms of
simplified models reveals constraints on possible BSM models (see, e.g. (the
ATLAS Collaboration 2015)). If a particular simplified model is ruled out by
experiment in some regime (again, we discuss this procedure in detail in §5),
then theoreticians have some evidence that those processes are excluded and
have grounds for introducing a corresponding constraint in their model build-
ing. Of course experimental data can be used to determine such constraints
as well. Nevertheless, simplified models do facilitate this function. For one, as
they are theory-driven models they have a more direct relation to full BSM
physics models than experimental data.14 The constraints can therefore be
stated in terms of the theoretical framework rather than in terms of experi-
mental observables. These inter-model relations can then be exploited to rule
out entire classes of BSM models that are not consistent with the experimental
data—as presented in a simplified model.
It is important to note that “ruling out” is actually somewhat too strong of
a term to use in this context. The hypothetical BSM model space is enormous.
Particular experimental signatures can be realized in subtle, complicated ways
in full BSM models (such as SUSY models). Properly “ruling out” models thus
only applies to BSM models that behave more or less like the simplified mod-
els that have been experimentally excluded (to a certain confidence level or in
terms of a posterior probability). For this reason a theoretical physicist who fa-
vors her model for theoretical reasons may not necessarily be deterred much by
a negative result upon comparison with experimental data expressed in terms
of a simplified model (she might in fact rather just see the full experimental
data and draw her own conclusions from them).
Given these functions and the caveats we point out, it may not seem like
simplified models are really of much value to theoretical physicists, since they
can apparently make direct comparisons between their models and the data
and take guidance directly from the data for building new models. This would
misunderstand, however, what the autonomy of simplified models affords in
this context. As Morrison and Morgan emphasize, the autonomy of simpli-
fied models is important for them to be instruments of learning. Simplified
models’ crucial function (from the point of view of theoretical physicists) is to
characterize a certain set of particle phenomenology that may be detected at
the LHC independently of any particular BSM scenario and its complicated
details. Simplified models are used as tools to inform physicists about the feasi-
bility of various BSM scenarios they entertain in their model building practice
(either by suggesting promising directions for model building or by indicating
unpromising ones). Thus what one learns from the use of simplified models is
something about whole classes of BSM physics—not merely something about
individual BSM models.
Why is this important? The space of SUSY models (let alone the space
of possible BSM physics models) is huge. Accordingly, there are simply far
14 Arkani-Hamed et al. note that “...the relation between Lagrangian parameters and ob-
servables is often obscure, and Monte Carlo [simulations] must be generated separately for
every point in the Lagrangian parameter space” (Arkani-Hamed et al. 2007, 3).
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too many SUSY models to test at the LHC (let alone BSM physics models
in general), so the conventional scientific method of deriving predictions from
a model and comparing those predictions with the experimental data is inef-
ficient and wholly impractical in this context.15 If theoretical physicists had
strong reasons to pursue particular models with constrained parameters, then
this massive model underdetermination would not be such a problem. But it
has become increasingly clear that BSM theorizing is quite unconstrained—
particle physicists no longer have a reliable guiding model (apart from the
general QFT framework) as they did with the SM, and there are no recal-
citrant collider data at present from which to build new phenomenological
models.
As said, a natural response to these circumstances is to constrain atten-
tion to small parameter spaces. However the usual approach to theorizing, e.g.
by assuming certain constraints, generally limits possible phenomenology too
much. For example, minimal supergravity (mSUGRA) has only four parame-
ters, but its assumptions would force strong constraints between parameters in
more general models, strongly limiting possible physical effects in these more
complete models. Not only is it unlikely that mSUGRA itself is correct (it is
a “toy model” (Hartmann 1995)), but, due to its constraining of the possible
phenomenology of full BSM models, the best fit mSUGRA model cannot not
tell us much about BSM physics. Other examples are similar; strong theoretical
constraints limit parameter spaces, but since those constraints are likely not
preserved in realistic BSM models, the small parameter spaces cannot tell us
much about BSM physics. The same goes for “small”, experiment-friendly pa-
rameter spaces like the constrained minimally supersymmetric standard model
(pMSSM).16
The alternative to the theory-driven approach is simply to wait for appro-
priate data, build phenomenological models of this data, and then use these
phenomenological models to guide theoretical BSM models. This approach
too is fairly impractical in this context. There is a massive range of possible
phenomenological models one could generate given significant discrepancies
between the SM predictions and collider data, as it is not clear what physical
processes might occur before the detection event (we revisit this problem in
more detail as well in §5).17
15 As noted in the introduction, the situation was quite different with the search for the
Higgs. Physicists have long had strong theoretical reasons to posit the Higgs mechanism
in the context of the SM (Karaca 2013; Borrelli 2015) and plausible limits to its empirical
parameters (Barger and Phillips 1987; Gunion et al. 1990). Thus, to some extent, the Higgs
discovery was no surprise at all for many (Dawid 2013, 37).
16 The minimally supersymmetric standard model (MSSM) is the minimal extension of
the SM that realizes supersymmetry. It has over 100 parameters in addition to the 19 SM
parameters. The introduction of additional constraints reduces the number of additional
parameters to 19 in what is known as the constrained MSSM or pMSSM.
17 There have been some attempts to grapple with this inverse problem in recent years,
which attempts eventually led to the simplified models program: (Bine´truy et al. 2004;
Knuteson and Mrenna 2006; Arkani-Hamed et al. 2006).
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Hence, given the aims of particle physicists and the present epistemologi-
cal situation (no guidance from experiment and little from theory), minimally
theoretical models are needed that are closely tied to the experiments which
particle physicists can currently perform.18 In other words, particle physicists
require a set of models that mediate between theory and experiment, by both
having the descriptive capacity to account for possible experimental signatures
while also connecting to possible BSM particle phenomenology and BSM the-
oretical “cores” like SUSY (Borrelli 2012).
Simplified models fit the bill quite well. They abstract from the details
of full BSM models to derive particle phenomenology that is potentially de-
tectable at the LHC. Because they retain physically significant relations to full
BSM models, data at the LHC can then be used to make inferences about BSM
physics (ruling out, guiding theory development). Key to motivating simpli-
fied models is the epistemological context of high energy physics. Since there
is limited theoretical and experimental guidance in BSM theorizing at present,
there is a significant underdetermination of physically plausible models which
undermines the application of familiar approaches to theory testing. Limiting
this underdetermination is crucial to make progress, but doing so by imposing
constraints severs the epistemological connection between constrained models
and more complete models. On the other hand, any forthcoming data from
the LHC would be consistent with a vast array of phenomenological models
which may have an inscrutable relation to full BSM models. Simplified models
solve these problems by limiting the underdetermination on “both sides” while
preserving strong links to more complete models and experimental data.
It is worth remarking, based on these considerations, that the role played
by simplified models can only be understood as part of the dynamical processes
of science (Hartmann 1995). In Hartmann’s sense they are model “substitutes
for theory”, since they provide some temporary explanatory, descriptive, and
heuristic resources despite the underlying theory being unknown. Indeed, con-
sidered in isolation of their historical and epistemological context simplified
models’ relevance and importance would be entirely opaque (because they are
deliberately incomplete models). Recalling the discussion of §2, attention solely
to the details of simplified models’ construction (i.e. that simplified models are
EFTs with a handful of parameters beyond the SM, etc.) and their use as tools
(ruling out full BSM models, etc.) overlooks the importance of how the context
in which they are situated elucidates the role that they play.
5 Experimentalist Perspectives on Simplified Models
The aspects of simplified models relevant for experimental practice have al-
ready been hinted at above. In this section we go into further detail by giving
the experimental perspective on simplified models. We begin with a specific
18 Similar models have been discussed under the names “developmental models” (Leplin
1980) and “exploratory models” (Gelfert 2016, Ch. 4).
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example to illustrate this perspective and then distill three important exper-
imental motivations for their development, drawing on suggestions in (Alwall
et al. 2009), (Alves et al. 2011), and (LHC New Physics Working Group 2012).
We focus our attention on a particular simplified model abstracted from
a certain SUSY process to illustrate the experimental functions of simplified
models. This specific BSM scenario is just one among several others that the
CMS Collaboration (2016) has been investigating. The relevant process for this
model (Fig. 2) involves the products of a proton-proton collision at the LHC
decaying into a pair of squarks (a top squark (t˜) and its antiparticle), which
in turn decay into a top quark (t) and its antiparticle and two LSPs (χ˜01).
This is (part of) a simplified model where the only relevant BSM phenomenon
is the production of the top squark and its antiparticle and their decays into
detectable SM particles (the quarks decay into jets of hadrons) and missing
energy (the LSPs). This simplified model (like any simplified model) abstracts
from any other kind of BSM particle production that might go on in proton-
proton collisions. Indeed, it abstracts from all the other relevant theoretical
parameters at work in SUSY models with the exception of masses and cross-
sections of the top squark and the LSP, as described in §3.
Fig. 2 Production of a top squark/anti-squark pair that decays into a top quark/anti-quark
pair and a pair of LSPs (copyright CERN / CMS 2016, under license CC BY 4.0)
Experimentalists look for a possible signal region where they know from
the SM what the background of events is going to look like. So, for example,
if 10 background events are expected on the basis of the SM and 20 events
are observed in that signal region, one can conclude that this excess of events
might be the sign of new BSM physics (depending of course on statistical
considerations).19 The first step in this procedure is to map the background:
this is done both via Monte Carlo simulations and also via control regions.
The latter are well-known regions within the Standard Model where no new
signals are expected, and they are regularly used to test the reliability of the
Monte Carlo simulations themselves used in the signal region.20 The signal
19 Some of these considerations concerning the statistical methodology of high energy
physics have recently been discussed by Dawid (2015, 2017), Cousins (2017), and Staley
(2017).
20 These procedures are in most respects similar to those carried out during the initial runs
of the LHC when searching for the Higgs. See (Franklin 2017) for an accessible description
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region where this decay process may be revealed in the data is identified by
a kinematic configuration that enhances as much as possible the signal and
reduces as much as possible the background. Experimentalists can then check
for any deviation in this signal region from the expected background. This is
done by translating, so to speak, the Feynman diagram of the simplified model
in Fig. 2 into the graph of Fig. 3, which shows the hypothetical production
rate for the top squark/anti-squark pair decaying into the LSP for a range of
possible mass parameter values in GeV for both particles.
Fig. 3 Graph showing exclusion region for simplified model consisting of the top squark
and its antiparticle decaying into LSPs (copyright CERN / CMS 2016, under license CC
BY 4.0)
In this example the mass of the top quark t is known, but neither the
mass of the hypothetical LSP nor that of the top squark is known. Thus,
the simplified model of Fig. 2 is rendered in the diagram as a convenient 2-
parameter model, which maps these two unknown masses of putative BSM
particles into a region (below the red lines) where their production rate (if
they exist!) could be measured against the SM expectations. To achieve this
goal, it is of course important that the new signatures for top squark and LSP
production differ in relevant ways from the signature of the top quark as well
as from other well-known signatures within the Standard Model that might
be relevant for this signal region.
of the experimental procedures of the LHC during the Higgs discovery. (Morrison 2015)
discusses the role of simulation in LHC experiments.
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Fig. 3 shows how a range of possible mass values for the top squark decaying
into an LSP fares vis-a-vis the expected Standard Model background. The
Standard Model expectations are represented by the red dotted lines; observed
data from 2016 are represented by the black lines. In other words, Fig. 3 shows
how many SM background events are expected in the region from 200 to 800
GeV and whether or not a deviation (i.e. an excess of events, which might be
the signature top squarks decaying into the LSP) has been detected in this
region. What Fig. 3 ultimately tells us is that no evidence for top squarks
decaying into LSPs has been found in this energy region, i.e. there are no
significant excesses of events below the dotted red and continuous black lines.
Experimentalists therefore conclude that in this energy region this simplified
model—a top squark pair decay—has been statistically ruled out.
The example illustrates in more detail some aspects of the functions dis-
cussed in §3, viz. to (1) rule out BSM models and (2) provide guidance in model
building. It also illustrates how simplified models have two important functions
for experimentalists. Simplified models can be used to (3) interpret experimen-
tal data and (4) assess experimental search procedures. A third function is also
important: simplified models can be used to (5) compare experimental data
from different colliders or experiments in an experiment-independent way. We
discuss these latter three functions and their associated aims in turn.
The first experimentally relevant aim of developing simplified models is to
have tools which can be used to interpret new data at the LHC.21 In other
words, simplified models play a useful role in answering the question of what
the data represent. Data models alone cannot provide such an interpretation,
for the detector events cannot have an unambiguous interpretation in physical
terms, i.e. kinds of particles and decay processes. As noted previously, many
conceivable BSM physical processes are compatible with and may result in the
same detectable events. Simplified models supply a transparent, easy-to-use in-
terpretation of experimental data in terms of new particles (their cross-sections
and branching ratios) or their absence, and hence a means to characterize the
data obtained by the detectors at the LHC (albeit a characterization that may
significantly distort the real underlying physical processes!). Since simplified
models focus on experimental observables (masses, branching ratios, cross sec-
tions), it is easy to compare data with simplified models and check for any
eventual excesses in the expected SM events that might be the signature for
new possible BSM particles. The data can then be presented in terms of sim-
plified models (alongside more typical presentations such as signature-based
results and comparisons of data to benchmark models, e.g. the constrained or
phenomenological MSSM), as has been standardly done in numerous reports
from the ATLAS and CMS experiments at the LHC since 2011.
This function of simplified models, viz. as interpretations of new experi-
mental signals, allows experimentalists to learn something about the results of
21 “If an excess of...events is seen in LHC data, a theoretical framework in which to describe
it will be essential to constraining the structure of the new physics” (Alwall et al. 2009, 1).
Simplified models provide “a useful starting point for characterizing positive signals of new
physics” (LHC New Physics Working Group 2012, 2).
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their experiments and the phenomena responsible for them. Because simplified
models are deliberately incomplete models and hence plausibly may not di-
rectly represent the phenomena, experimentalists likely cannot learn precisely
what is causing their data. Nevertheless, simplified models allow experimental-
ists to give some contentful physical characterization of what is causing their
data. Moreover, they can give one that connects to plausible complete BSM
models (§4). Although this characterization may distort the actual facts to
some degree (even completely!), it does not preclude learning some important
physical facts about the underlying phenomena.
The second experimentally relevant aim of developing simplified models is
to evaluate and revise experimental search strategies. As simplified models are
designed to capture a complete range of expected BSM particle phenomenol-
ogy, they can be used to reveal potentially overlooked particle phenomenology
in standard search strategies (LHC New Physics Working Group 2012, 4). Ini-
tial BSM searches at the LHC were based primarily on strategies developed
for Standard Model searches (searches for the Higgs in particular) or extended
strategies appropriate for particular benchmark models, e.g. the MSSM (Alves
et al. 2011). Such strategies may however be inadequate to revealing other
(non-MSSM or non-SM-like) BSM physics, giving rise to an important source
of experimental risk, namely that the LHC may be producing BSM particles
which remain undetected because of the particular search strategies employed.
Assessing the experimental signatures of a wide range of simplified models in
relation to the sensitivity of LHC search strategies can suggest needed strat-
egy modifications and particular experimental searches worth undertaking.
The need for autonomy from experiment and a degree of model-independence
for this aim should be evident.
The third experimental application of simplified models is to compare ex-
perimental data from different experiments. They are useful for this task be-
cause simplified models are independent of any particular experiment (Alwall
et al. 2009, 2). Experimental data from different experiments may be difficult
to compare directly, due to different experimental methodologies, setups, etc.
Combining data sets from different experiments is obviously important, and
there are, naturally, various statistical methods employed to do just this in
all areas of science.22 Theory-driven models, unlike such statistical methods,
have the advantage of supplying a unified interpretive locus for making direct
comparisons.23 This is certainly not to say, however, that statistical methods
for combining data are inferior to theory-driven comparisons; it is just to point
out that the uncertainties involved in the two approaches are different, so what
one can learn from each data-comparison approach is different and potentially
mutually informing.
22 As an example of the methodology used in particle physics, the Tevatron and LHC
experiments first joint results are presented in (the ATLAS Collaboration et al. 2014).
23 In particular, “simplified models provide a figure of merit for comparing searches at
different collider experiments, because the kinematics and cross-sections expected for a sim-
plified model at different colliders can be computed from their fundamental parameters”
(LHC New Physics Working Group 2012, 24).
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To conclude this section, we emphasize that, since they are independent
of particular collider experiments, simplified models allow experimentalists
to learn something about the phenomena in a slightly experiment- and data-
independent way (while still of course providing an interpretation of the data).
This is important because data from a collider experiment may be dependent
in various ways on the experimental apparatus and methodology, i.e. ways
which do not directly represent the physical phenomena being studied. Com-
parisons of data are useful precisely because they can uncover the presence
of these dependencies. Since simplified models may function as tools of data
comparison, they can be used to reveal the underlying phenomena, shorn of
irrelevant distortions from the nature of the experiment.
Each of these three experimental functions of simplified modelsdata in-
terpretation, assessment of experimental methodology, and data comparison
across different experimentsdepend on the relative independence of simplified
models from experimental data. As simplified models are constructed to be
autonomous in this sense, they function autonomously in the three aforemen-
tioned ways, i.e. as tools for learning specific things about the data and the
experiment. As a particular illustrative application of these considerations, we
turn in the next section to discussing some connections between our study and
the epistemological issues raised by Big Data.
6 Big Data and BSM Searches
High energy physics is usually presented as one of the areas in contemporary
science where so-called Big Data and its related epistemological issues arise.
Data-intensive science is an extremely broad domain of inquiry arising in in-
formatics, social sciences, physical sciences and life sciences. Only recently
philosophers of science have begun to focus their attention on data-intensive
science, with a focus primarily on machine learning, biology, and the social
sciences (e.g., (Floridi 2012; Leonelli 2014; Pietsch 2016)). Hard as it is to give
a definition, data-intensive science has been characterized in terms of the sheer
amount of information handled and the technological challenges it poses for
data acquisition, data storage, and data analysis.
Adding to some of the concerns that philosophers of science have already
raised about the epistemological novelty of Big Data, in e.g. biology (Leonelli
2012), the epistemological challenges of the search for BSM physics reveal an
interesting Big Data issue in high energy physics, an issue which simplified
models are intended to address. The problem begins with the previously men-
tioned fact that BSM physics is not only highly underdetermined by empirical
data but by theoretical considerations as well. This issue becomes exacerbated
by the Big Data environment of the LHC. In the social sciences which in-
volve Big Data the main challenge, e.g. in microtargeting (modeling voters’
behavior to make polls), is modeling a great quantity of discrete, well-defined,
and easily identifiable demographic data (e.g. age, race, gender of the voters).
In biomedical sciences the main challenge consists in collating large volume
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of decontextualized yet still well-defined and easily identifiable data (e.g. ap-
pearance, behavior, breeding) about given species of organisms (e.g. over a
thousand in the case of drosophila), storing the data, and re-using it for vari-
ous purposes. But in high energy physics the epistemological challenges arising
from the high volume of data go beyond the classification, organization, stor-
age and re-use of data (although these are certainly present).
It might be tempting just to think that the Big Data challenge is the same
here as elsewhere. That is, the challenge in high energy physics is the problem
of tracking a high-volume of data representing particles impinging on various
particle detectors. While this is certainly a challenge, it is a challenge that
has been adequately solved at the LHC—at least for the search for the Higgs.
The SM could be used to suggest some plausible constraints on where to look
for its experimental signature (mass ranges, important decay chains where the
Higgs would appear before decaying into detectable events, etc.). This led to
the development of particular search strategies, where certain detector events
were ignored (either in hardware or through software “triggers” (Karaca 2017))
due to limitations in data storage capacity and processing rates at CERN.
Since physicists knew (more or less) what they were looking for, they were
able to optimize their search to find it. And indeed, they did find it (the
ATLAS Collaboration 2012a; the CMS Collaboration 2012).
Unlike in biomedical science or social science, in BSM searches, where the
aim is to discover new physics, the problem of transient underdetermination
(Sklar 1981) of theory by data arises. For every data pattern detected at
the CMS or ATLAS experiments at CERN, there is, as mentioned above, a
multiplicity of possible BSM particles and decay channels that might have led
to exactly the same data pattern (be it the pattern of a signature/ excess of
events vis-a`-vis background). Since decisions have to be made, however, about
which data to keep and which data to throw away (due to the quantity of
data produced in collisions) and since scientists do not have much guidance in
where precisely to look for data signatures that would suggest new physics, a
distinctive Big Data problem arises in high energy physics (and of course in
other exploratory contexts as well).
Simplified models mitigate this problem to some extent. Simplified models
essentially undercut the underdetermination problem by the way they medi-
ate between theory and experiment. Theory first provides some guidance in
what to look for by suggesting theoretically-motivated phenomenology. This
guidance is turned into model substitutes for theory, viz. simplified models.
These models then can be used to optimize searches for these kinds of phe-
nomenology, mitigating the problem from Big Data. Given experimental data,
they can next provide a tool for interpreting experimental data. Interpreted
in terms of a simplified model, the data can finally be used to rule out full
BSM models and suggest guidance on model building. If there is BSM physics,
this procedure provides a realistic method for finding it, characterizing it, and
eventually settling on a physically plausible BSM model. Thus simplified mod-
els solve the “Learner’s Paradox” problem in the usual way: one does not have
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to know precisely what one is looking for; one just has to know what one is
looking for well enough in order to progress.
7 Conclusion
The novel perspective on the “models as mediators” framework introduced
in §2 usefully emphasizes the importance of certain epistemological questions
which have so far been little investigated in the philosophical literature on
models in science. Inquiring into why models are constructed to have the
autonomy from theory and data that they have is facilitated by looking to
the aims of scientists who make use of them. These aims provide clues as to
what determines the degree of independence and dependence that a model has
with respect to theory and data. In general the epistemological context of a
science plays a crucial role in determining the needed autonomy of a model.
To illustrate these ideas we presented the case of simplified models from high
energy physics research. Simplified models solve two major epistemological
problems faced by physicists searching for beyond standard model physics.
The first is a serious underdetermination of theory by evidence (both em-
pirical and otherwise). This underdetermination is not the logical underdeter-
mination familiar in philosophical debates, but the kind relevant for making
methodological decisions in science, viz.`‘transient” (Sklar 1981) or “scientific”
(Dawid 2013) underdetermination. There are a variety of theoretical options
currently available, but the lack of confidence in any individual model means
there is little consistent guidance available for conducting experiments, and
testing all the possible models would be massively inefficient and impractical.
The second is an analogous “underdetermination of data patterns”. Insofar
as one believe the Standard Model is correct, then there is no underdetermi-
nation; the SM tells us exactly what we should expect to see in the future—
nothing new at all. But there is a variety of reasons to suppose that there
should be BSM physics. Without the guidance from theory, experimentalists
do not know precisely what they are looking for (or at, should they see a
new signature in the data). One might think that they can simply run the
collider and look for discrepancies between SM predictions and the data, but
the amount and complexity of the data make the situation somewhat more
challenging than this. Experimentalists need theoretical guidance so that they
know where to look in the massive amounts of data for potential new phenom-
ena.
We have argued that simplified models solve these two problems by me-
diating between theory and data. To mitigate the transient underdetermina-
tion faced in high energy physics, it is natural to follow the EFT philosophy
and attend to low energy EFTs relevant to the experimental capacities of the
LHC. As EFTs, simplified models are dependent on the theoretical frame-
work of QFT, but they abstract from complete BSM physics models, such as
SUSY models, because of physicists’ uncertainty about BSM physics. BSM
physics models do, however, suggest a range of particle phenomenology that
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the LHC could detect. Each simplified model corresponds to some plausible
phenomenology, although no model by itself is physically plausible as a com-
plete BSM physics model. Because of their clear theoretical connections to
more complete BSM physics models, simplified models can be used to rule out
(or at least disfavor) the latter, as well as suggest plausible constraints and
guidance for future model building (of complete models).
Simplified models also mitigate the epistemological problems on the ex-
perimental side. They provide a ready interpretation of the data in terms of
particles and experimentally accessible parameters. As they cover the range
of plausible particle phenomenology, they can be used to assess the sensitiv-
ity of experimental search strategies to potentially observable discrepancies
between the SM and data. (We also noted the value of having a simple tool
for comparing data from different experimental apparatuses.) The indepen-
dence of theory-driven models (like simplified models) from the data (which is
characterized merely in terms of detector events) is clearly necessary for these
particular interpretive, evaluative, and comparative functions.
We therefore conclude that the construction of simplified models is sub-
stantially based in attempting to solve salient epistemological problems faced
by physicists in searching for BSM physics. Simplified models are constructed
to be independent and dependent on theory and data, i.e. autonomous, in
particular ways and to particular extents because of these circumstances. By
expanding our attention beyond the details of the model to the larger theo-
retical and experimental context, we see that the learning goals of physicists
are based substantially on these epistemological considerations, which then
determine the needed functions of the set of models, and hence what auton-
omy must be “built into” them. Although we do not expect all cases to mirror
our own in their particulars, as what is epistemically relevant in each context
surely varies, insight into scientific methodology and practice can likely be
gained by investigating the issues we have related here in other cases.
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